Moderator Miljana Bigovic opened the International Arbitration Forum live session by framing why “guerrilla tactics” remain a live challenge for arbitral efficiency and procedural fairness. She was joined by Joel Soon, Matej Pustay, Knud Jacob Knudsen, and Susan Mutangadura, who each brought a distinct lens to the issue.

Soon introduced his research underpinning the session and set out the core definitions, drivers, and remedies; Pustay tested the definitional boundaries and the point at which hard-fought advocacy becomes a “tactic”; Knudsen drew on institutional decision-making around arbitrator challenges and his experience sitting as an arbitrator; and Mutangadura highlighted counsel-switch manoeuvres designed to manufacture conflicts of interest, alongside practical procedural countermeasures.

Guerrilla warfare in arbitration, as a contemporary and increasingly visible phenomenon, draws parallels to its military origins: small, disruptive manoeuvres intended to harass, delay, and derail. He traced the term “arbitration guerrillas” to a 2005 framing in which parties and lawyers exploit procedural levers to gain advantage, most commonly by engineering delay or pushing proceedings towards ineffectiveness.

What Counts as “Guerrilla Tactics”

Soon offered a spectrum of conduct, from procedural obstruction to serious wrongdoing. Common examples cited included dilatory tactics and frivolous challenges, with more extreme illustrations extending to wiretapping/surveillance fraud and threats of physical harm.

A recurring theme: classification is rarely straightforward in real time. Pustay argued the starting point must be definitional clarity, whether the label requires delay as the objective, or whether plainly unnecessary conduct (even if not time-extending) qualifies.

“The Classics” in Practice

Repeated arbitrator challenges (especially in investment arbitration).
Soon identified repeated disqualification challenges as one of the most common tactics, particularly in investment arbitration, where serial challenges can be deployed to stall momentum. Knudsen echoed this from an institutional vantage point, describing how the same dispute may generate successive challenges, creating decision churn and delay incentives.

Late evidence manoeuvres that threaten the timetable.
Knudsen described late-stage evidentiary requests, especially third-party evidence requiring court assistance made after key milestones (including hearing dates) are set, effectively knocking the arbitration off its agreed procedural course.

Counsel changes engineered to create conflicts.
Mutangadura flagged a particularly disruptive tactic: switching counsel mid-arbitration in a way that manufactures a conflict for an arbitrator, then asserting the “right to counsel of choice” as cover. Her proposed response was preventative: address it explicitly early, including in the first procedural order, to preserve tribunal discretion over counsel changes that are designed to undermine the tribunal’s integrity.

Why it Persists

Soon offered three drivers:

1. An “ethical no man’s land”. There is no single universal standard for acceptable conduct in arbitration, so what looks like acceptable lawyering to one practitioner may be viewed as tactical abuse by another.
2. Due process paranoia. Tribunals may hesitate to act decisively for fear of later award challenge on “right to be heard” grounds.
3. A closely-knit market. Arbitrators may be cautious about appearing overly interventionist, given reputational and appointment dynamics.

How Tribunals Respond (and where the limits show)

Soon outlined common tools:

• Costs sanctions. Tribunals sometimes respond by awarding costs where conduct indicates tactical abuse, though the extent of power to sanction counsel directly remains debated.
• Ethics frameworks (national rules; IBA Guidelines on Party Representation). These can serve as reference points, but the Guidelines are non-binding and unevenly adopted, resulting in inconsistent practical effects.

Pustay added a practical realism: tribunals may not always “say it out loud”, but procedural behaviour can shape how arguments are received, particularly on issues where discretion is in play.

Handling the Problem Without Derailing Fairness

Two operational principles emerged:

• Hold the procedural line (especially the hearing date). Knudsen emphasised that tribunals need the courage to treat the timetable as a serious commitment; absent something genuinely extraordinary, the process should not be disturbed by manoeuvres that would force postponement.
• Front-load integrity protections. Mutangadura’s suggestion to address counsel-change conflict engineering upfront was part of a wider theme: prevent predictable disruption through early procedural architecture.

Reform: Urgency, Scepticism, And a Middle Path

On whether the field needs more rules, the panel was cautious. Pustay did not see an immediate need for sweeping harmonisation, framing it instead as a behavioural issue that counsel should keep front of mind, managed case-by-case within proceedings.
Knudsen agreed on new rules, but warned institutions to be alert to “safe” decisions on challenges that could lower thresholds over time and encourage tactical filings.
Soon suggested a possible conceptual anchor: clearer recognition of procedural integrity and “abuse of process” principles (borrowed from broader international adjudication), while acknowledging how difficult it is to design reforms that are both effective and workable across the arbitration ecosystem.

Five Point Session Summary

• Treat “guerrilla tactics” as a spectrum; the hard part is distinguishing zealous advocacy from bad-faith disruption in real time.
• Repeated arbitrator challenges remain a high-frequency risk area, especially where the challenger benefits from delay.
• Procedural discipline matters: a firm timetable is itself a remedy, provided tribunals are willing to enforce it.
• Consider early procedural guardrails on counsel changes that could compromise tribunal independence.
• Even where tribunals appear to “allow” questionable moves, that does not mean they are indifferent; the conduct may reappear in costs and in how close calls are assessed.